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We propose a joint encryption and compression (JEC) scheme with emphasis on application to video data. The proposed JEC
scheme uses the philosophy of distributed source coding with side information to reduce the complexity of the compression
process and at the same time uses cryptographic principles to ensure that security is built into the scheme. The joint distributed
compression and encryption is achieved using a special class of codes called high-diﬀusion (HD) codes that were proposed recently
in the context of joint error correction and encryption. By using the duality between channel codes and Slepian-Wolf coding,
we construct a joint compression and encryption scheme that uses these codes in the diﬀusion layer. We adapt this cipher to
MJPEG2000 with the inclusion of minimal amount of joint processing of video frames at the encoder.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With several multimedia applications being launched over
the Internet, compression and encryption of this type of data
have gained a lot of attention. The issue of complexity in
compression is taken into consideration in the video coding
standards such as MJPEG2000 [1] where only the intraframe
coding is performed to keep the computational complexity
low. Nevertheless, video sequences are rich in interframe cor-
relation and an eﬃcient compression scheme should make
use of this property. Traditionally, the approach has been to
compress the data first and then encrypt in a concatenated
manner. It is potentially possible to reduce the complexity
of the compression and encryption if a joint paradigm for
both functions could be designed. In this paper, we present
a joint approach to encryption and compression of digitized
data and formulate a secure MJPEG2000 framework that we
call SMJPEG2000. Attempts to combine the computational
steps in compression and encryption include multiple Huﬀ-
man tables (MHT) based approach [2], Arithmetic Coding
with Key-based interval Splitting (KSAC) [3], and random-
ized arithmetic coding (RAC) [4]. In MHT, diﬀerent tables
are used for compression. The tables and the order in which
they are used to encode the symbols are kept secret. KSAC
is designed to achieve both compression and confidential-
ity by using keys to specify how the intervals will be par-
titioned in each iteration of the arithmetic encoding. RAC
diﬀers from KSAC only in that the keys are used to spec-
ify the order of the intervals instead of the positions where
they will be split. MHT and KSAC have been shown to be
vulnerable to low complexity known and/or to chosen plain-
text attacks [5]. Our work diﬀers from the above in that we
develop a framework for joint encryption and compression
of correlated sources like a video sequence. The compression
component of our algorithm works on the concept of matrix-
based coding that has emerged in the distributed source cod-
ing community.
Distributed source coding has emerged as an alterna-
tive to achieve low-complexity compression for correlated
sources. Based on the theoretical results by Slepian and Wolf
on lossless coding, and the extension of it to lossy cod-
ing with quantization by Wyner and Ziv in the 1970s, the
development of practical coding schemes has commenced
recently. Pradhan and Ramchandran [6] presented a con-
structive practical framework based on algebraic trellis codes
dubbed distributed source coding using syndromes (DIS-
CUS), that is applicable in a variety of settings. Girod et
al. presented a scheme based on Wyner-Ziv coding where
intraframe encoder is combined with interframe decoding
to achieve excellent compression ratios with low-encoding
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complexity [7]. This framework also has been used to analyze
concatenated compression and encryption schemes. Johnson
et al. proved that reversing the order of compression and en-
cryption to compress the encrypted data can still achieve sig-
nificant compression [8]. In some cases, the proof is based
on the framework of distributed source coding with side in-
formation, and the encryption key plays the role of side in-
formation.
Our work presented in this paper is about achieving both
security and compression with the same set of computational
operations. In our proposed joint encryption and compres-
sion (JEC) scheme, we use a class of codes called the high-
diﬀusion codes (HD codes) [9–13] that were proposed in the
context of joint encryption and error correction. In the cur-
rent work, the JEC scheme has a structure similar to the ad-
vanced encryption standard (AES) [14, 15] in that it is a key
alternating block cipher. The diﬀusion box of our proposed
cipher performs the dual function of compression as well as
diﬀusion. Diﬀusion is a necessary element in block ciphers
like the AES, to spread the statistical characteristics of the ci-
pher state as quickly as possible and is measured in terms of
the branch number. We establish the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for achieving a compression function satisfying the
branch number property and show that distributed compres-
sion using the HD codes can satisfy this condition.
In Section 2, we discuss the concepts behind the pro-
posed approach and present the framework showing the fea-
sibility of joint-distributed encryption and compression. The
proposed scheme is elaborated in Section 3. The applica-
tion of this approach to achieve security and compression
in SMJPEG2000 is described in Section 4. The implementa-
tion and simulation results are presented in Section 5. Con-
clusions follow in Section 6.
2. FEASIBILITY OF JOINT-DISTRIBUTED
ENCRYPTION AND COMPRESSION
In the distributed source coding framework of SMJPEG2000,
there are two underlying sources X and Y generating corre-
lated information in the form of sequences of symbols in a
Galois field of order 28 (GF(256)). The correlation is such
that any block of n consecutive symbols generated by X dif-
fers at most by t(<n) symbols from n consecutive symbols
simultaneously generated by Y . As per the Slepian-Wolf the-
orem [16], X can be compressed to achieve a bit rate ap-
proaching the conditional entropy H(X | Y) and with the
knowledge of Y , the decoder is able to recover X perfectly.
The source X does not need to know Y to achieve this.
In order to guarantee confidentiality, we would also like
to encrypt X to produce a cipher text, EX , such that an ad-
versary that knows nothing about the key cannot infer any-
thing about X by observing EX alone. In other words, we
require the conditional probability distribution P(X | EX)
to be equal to the probability distribution P(X) [17]. Except
with keys based on a one-time pad [18], perfect secrecy is
known to be infeasible. Nevertheless, ciphers are considered
to be computationally secure if (a) the time required to break
the cipher is more than the useful time of the data being en-
crypted and (b) the cost of computation to break the cipher
is more than the value of the information [19]. In AES, this
is achieved via the round functions where each round con-
sists of a sequence of cryptographic primitives, namely, key
addition, substitution, row shifting, and column mixing.
In this work, we provide a framework where the diﬀusion
layer of the cipher has dual functionality: (a) compressing
the correlated source and (b) providing the requisite diﬀu-
sion for the cipher. Since the success of the compression de-
pends on exploiting the correlation between the sources, it is
imperative to make sure that the diﬀusion operation in our
joint compression/encryption scheme does not destroy the
correlation. To do this, we show that the key addition does not
change the bitwise Hamming distance between X and Y and
substitution does not change the bytewise Hamming distance
and preserves the correlation.
2.1. Hamming distance under key XOR operation
The following lemma establishes that bitwise Hamming dis-
tance remains unchanged under key-addition operation.
Lemma 1. Let x and y be two n-tuples in Fn2 (binary) and let
K be a third such n-tuple representing the secret key. Then
dH(x ⊕ K , y ⊕ K) = dH(x, y), (1)
where dH(·, ·) is the bitwise Hamming distance.
Proof. The Hamming distance between x and y can be
found by the XOR operation followed by computation of
the weight, that is, dH(x, y) = w(x ⊕ y). For example, if
x = 01001 and y = 11010, then x ⊕ y = 10011 and
w(x ⊕ y) = 3 which is the Hamming distance between x and
y. Therefore we can also write
dH(x ⊕ K , y ⊕ K) = w
(
(x ⊕ K)⊕ (y ⊕ K)). (2)
The XOR operation⊕ is associative. Therefore we can rewrite
(2) as
dH(x ⊕ K , y ⊕ K) = w
(
(x ⊕ y)⊕ (K ⊕ K))
= w(x ⊕ y)⊕ 0
= w(x ⊕ y)
= dH(x, y),
(3)
thus we prove (1). In the above, 0 represents an all-zero n-
tuple.
It can be easily verified that this lemma is also valid when
x, y, and k are n-tuples with elements from Galois field,
GF(2m) for any positive integer m.
2.2. Correlation under substitution operation
An S-box in AES performs substitution of a symbol with an-
other such that each byte of the plain text is uniquely mapped
to another byte in a one-on-one manner. Thus, if ith bytes of
two diﬀerent blocks of plain text are equal prior to substitu-
tion, then they are equal following the substitution process
as well. On the other hand, if ith bytes of the two blocks of
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plain text are diﬀerent, then they will remain diﬀerent fol-
lowing the substitution. Therefore, we can conclude that the
bytewise Hamming distance between two multibyte blocks of
data does not change under the substitution operation. How-
ever, at bit level, the Hamming distance may change due to
the substitution depending on the S-box. Therefore, the sub-
stitution operation can be considered to be nonlinear opera-
tion at the bit level, and linear at the byte level. We show in
the sequel that the conditional entropy H(X | Y) is preserved
under linear or nonlinear mapping as long as the mapping is
one on one.
Lemma 2. Let the random variables X and Y assume values
in the discrete sets {xi | i = 1, . . . ,n} and {yi | i = 1, . . . ,n},
respectively. If the joint probability of the random variables X
and Y is symmetric such that p(X = xi,Y = yj) = p(X =
xj ,Y = yi) or simply p(xi, yj) = p(xj , yi) for all i, j = 1, . . . ,n,
then H(X | Y) = H(Y | X).
Proof. p(xi, yj) = p(xj , yi) implies the equality of marginal
probabilities, that is, p(xi) = p(yi) leading to p(yj | xi) =
p(xj | yi). By definition,





















































= H(Y | X).
(4)
Lemma 3. If the mapping X→U = g(X) is one on one, then
H
(
Y | g(X)) = H(Y | X). (5)
Proof. With one-on-one mapping we have p(X = x) =
p(u = g(X = x)) and similar result holds for joint proba-
bilities. The result is self-explanatory from the definition of
conditional entropy.
Theorem 1. If (a), the joint probability matrix of X and Y , is
symmetric (b) the mapping X→U = g(X) is one on one, then
H
(
g(X) | Y) = H(X | Y). (6)
Proof. From Lemma 2, we have
H
(
g(X) | Y) = H(Y | g(X)). (7)
From Lemma 3, we have
H
(
g(X) | Y) = H(Y | X). (8)
Again from Lemma 2, we have
H
(
g(X) | Y) = H(X | Y). (9)
3. JOINT-DISTRIBUTED ENCRYPTION AND
COMPRESSION FRAMEWORK
One of the practical methods of constructing Slepian-Wolf
codes is to use binning based on good linear channel codes.
Let x be an n-tuple generated by the sourceX ; and let y be the
n-tuple simultaneously generated by the correlated source Y .
Both x and y can be considered as noise-corrupted versions
of valid codewords generated by an (n, k) linear block code,
C. Further, x can be modeled as a noise-corrupted version of
y if the correlation between X and Y can be modeled as ad-
ditive noise. If dmin is the minimum distance of C, then for
any n-tuple x, there exists a valid codeword cx within a Ham-
ming distance t = dmin /2, the maximum number of cor-
rectable errors of the linear-block code. Similar result holds
for y. Further, if the Hamming distance between x and y is
≤ t, we have
x = cx + ex,
y = cy + ey ,
y = x + ec = cx + ex + ec,
(10)
where cx, cy are the valid codewords within a Hamming dis-
tance ≤ t; ex and ey are the error patterns corresponding to
x and y, respectively, and ec is the error pattern representing
the correlation between x and y.
Now let H be the (n − k) × n parity check matrix. Then
the projections of n-tuples x and y onto the dual space result
in the syndromes Sx = xHT and Sy = yHT , that is,
xHT = cxHT + exHT = 0 + Sx,
yHT = cyHT + eyHT = 0 + Sy ,
(11)
where HT is the transpose of H . Further we may write
Sy = yHT = xHT + ecHT = Sx + Sc, (12)
that is,
Sc = Sx + Sy. (13)
Note that the syndromes are (n − k) tuples. This result
leads to the method of compression and lossless decoding of
X with the knowledge of side-information Y and the correla-
tion between X and Y . The transmitter can compute Sx and
send to the receiver where Y is available. Then the syndrome
Sc can be computed using the received syndrome Sx and y.
The error pattern ec corresponding to Sc can be computed us-
ing a syndrome decoding technique. Since the HD code used
in the proposed cipher is a general case of RS codes [13], the
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [20] that is generally used to
decode RS codes, can be adapted in the decode/decrypt op-
eration of this joint cipher. The n-tuple x can be found from
x = y + ec. (14)
Since the n-tuple x is transformed into the n − k tuple
Sx, we achieve a compression ratio of n/(n−k). In the design
of JEC, the transform used for compression, namely, the par-
ity check matrix of the underlying linear block code, should
4 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
achieve the required spreading, or the diﬀusion achieved by
the column mixing operations in the AES cipher. Diﬀusion
is required to achieve robustness against both diﬀerential
cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. It has been shown [15]
that the diﬀusion caused by a transform can be eﬀectively
measured using the branch number. Definitions 1 and 2 and
Lemma 4 provide a concise description of branch number.
Definition 1. The diﬀerential branch number of a transform,
φ, mapping an n-tuple to an l-tuple is defined as
Bdiﬀd = min

















where x1 and x2 are two input n-tuples (x1 /= x2) and dH is
the Hamming distance in a number of symbols [15].
Definition 2. The linear branch number of a transform, φ,
mapping an n-tuple x to an l-tuple is defined as







where w(·) is the Hamming weight.
Lemma 4. The upper bound of branch number is l + 1.
Proof. With a diﬀusion-optimized transform, φ, a change
in a single symbol x1 should result in changes in all the
output symbols leading to dH(x1, x2) + dH(φ(x1),φ(x2))
= l + 1, which is the minimum (maximum of this sum be-
ing n + l) and therefore is the branch number by Defini-
tions 1 and 2.
The design of the diﬀusion layer in Rijndael cipher
adopted in AES ensures this upper bound for all possible val-
ues of linear/diﬀerential weights of the input [21]. We show
in Theorem 2 that the necessary and suﬃcient condition to
achieve such linear and diﬀerential branch number proper-
ties is that the transform φ is a totally positive matrix. The
formal definition of a totally positive matrix is as follows.
Definition 3. A rectangular matrix A = (ai j), i = 1, . . . ,n;
j = 1, . . . , l is called totally positive if all its minors (determi-
nants of submatrices) of any order are positive [22].
Although the original definition in [22] is for matrices of
real values, it can be easily extended to the case with elements
in Galois field GF(2m).
Theorem 2. Over a field F , the linear transformation of
n-tuples in an n-dimensional space, Vn, into l-tuples in an
l(≤ n)-dimensional space, Vl by an operation y = xA,
achieves the branch number properties if (suﬃcient) and only
if (necessary) A is a totally positive matrix.
Proof. First we prove that total positivity is a necessary condi-
tion to achieve the branch number properties. From Defini-
tions 1, 2, and Lemma 4, for transformation A to be optimal
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Let x1 ⊕ x2 = e. Then (18) reduces to
w(e) + w(eA) ≥ l + 1. (19)
The minimum values of w(eA) corresponding to the values
of w(e) required to satisfy (19) are as given in Table 1.
It can be seen that for w(e) = r, min {w(eA)} = l −
(r − 1). Let the columns of A be denoted by hj , j = 1, . . . , l.
Then with a given r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, we require A to have at
most r − 1 columns such that e·hj = 0. This implies that in
the r × l submatrix formed by selecting the rows of A corre-
sponding to the nonzero elements of e, every r× r submatrix
(contiguous as well as noncontiguous) should be of full rank.
Since the r nonzero elements in e can occur at any r out of n-
positions, the above implies that every r × r submatrix of A
should be of full rank, that is, positive for r = 1, . . . , l. Thus
by Definition 3, A should be a totally positive matrix.
Next we prove that the total positivity of the transfor-
mation matrix is suﬃcient to achieve the maximum branch
number. If A is a totally positive matrix, every r × r subma-
trix is positive, that is, has full rank for r = 1, . . . , l. Let the
rows of A be ai, i = 1, . . . ,n. Then the linear combination of
any r rows,
∑ r
i=1αiai with αi > 0 results in an l-tuple with at
most r−1 zero elements leading to w(e) +w(eA) = l+ 1 and
hence achieves the branch number. While this proof explic-
itly addresses the case of diﬀerential branch number, the case
of linear branch number is implicit.
From Theorem 2, we achieve a test for branch-number
property for any given transform. Further, it serves as a
guideline for designing transforms to achieve the desired
branch-number properties. While the testing of all possi-
ble square submatrices of a matrix for positivity has an
exponential-order complexity, [23, Theorem 9] provides a
method of polynomial-order complexity. This theorem states
that a square matrix is totally positive if and only if all its ini-
tial minors are positive. The initial minors are minors that
are contiguous and include the first row or the first column.
This approach reduces the number of minors required to be
tested for an n× n matrix from ( 2nn
)− 1 to n2.
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One known example of totally positive matrix is the gen-










1 a1 a21 · · · a(p−1)1

















where 0 < a1 < a2 < · · · < an.
Recently a class of codes called high-diﬀusion codes
(HD-codes) were developed [9, 12] which incorporated the
branch-number criterion as well as the being maximum
distance separable. Two constructions for error-correcting
ciphers were then proposed using these codes [10, 11,
13]. In this paper, we will use the duality between error-
correcting codes and Slepian-Wolf coding to construct a
joint-compression encryption system using these HD codes.
4. SECURE MJPEG2000 (SMJPEG2000)
The distributed source coding framework for correlated
sources can be used in secure compression of video se-
quences. Figure 1 shows the image coding framework as per
JPEG2000. In the motion JPEG2000 (MJPEG2000), each
frame is simply encoded independent of the rest of the
frames. In JPEG2000, the 2D wavelet transform provides the
diﬀerent subbands as in Figure 2. The subbands of a frame
from “foreman” sequence are shown as an example. The
wavelet coeﬃcients are then quantized and converted to in-
tegers. Treating these integer values as symbols, entropy cod-
ing is achieved by the use of run-length coding followed by
Huﬀman coding [24]. The one-dimensional sequence, {xn},
of symbols from the alphabet AX is run-length coded by re-
placing {xn} with a sequence of symbol pairs, {(ak, rk)}, rep-
resenting symbol values, ak ∈AX , and run-lengths, rk ∈ Z+,
where Z+ represents the set of nonnegative integers. The
mapping between {(ak, rk)} and {xn} is such that xn = ak
for all n such that
k−1∑
j=1
r j < n ≤
k∑
j=1
r j , (21)
where k = {1, 2, . . . } and n = {1, 2, . . . }. The value rk is
normally the longest run of symbols, xn,n >
∑ k−1
j=1r j , such
that xn has a constant value, an. The sequence of run-length
symbol pairs {(ak, rk)} is coded with Huﬀman code in our
experiments, although arithmetic coding may also be used.
Separate codes are constructed for the symbol values ak and
the run-lengths rk. Through experiments, we find that the
benefit of run-length coding in terms of the compression is
significant only for the zero values of the quantized wavelet
coeﬃcients. Thus the run-length coding in our work is con-
fined to coding of zero runs. Further, since the representation
of each run length requires two symbols, coding of only the
runs of three or more zeros results in compression.
Figure 3 shows our proposed framework where some


















Figure 1: Functional diagram of JPEG2000.
joint-distributed compression and encryption scheme. Fol-
lowing the quantization as in JPEG2000, the block of sym-
bols (integers) are run length coded. Next, each wavelet co-
eﬃcient is represented using the minimum required bits. In-
stead of the Huﬀman coding stage, the JEC is used. At the
decoder, joint decryption and decompression is performed
using information from the previously decoded frame as the
side information.
Cardinality of the set of symbols (integers), needed to
represent the quantized wavelet transforms, varies over each
subband. LL has the largest set whereas HH has the small-
est. Therefore, separate allocation of bits for each subband
is required. Once the symbols are represented by bits, they
are parsed to form a single block of bits for the entire frame.
Note that the application of run-length coding to each frame
independently would result in the loss of synchronization be-
tween the blocks of data corresponding to adjacent frames.
This will make it diﬃcult to apply the JEC scheme. In or-
der to overcome this issue, we propose to process a set of
frames jointly during run length coding. Thus only the sym-
bol runs that are common to all the frames in the set are
run-length coded. The first frame of each such set serves as
the key frame and is compressed independently of the re-
maining frames just as in the current JPEG2000. However,
for the run-length computations as mentioned above, we in-
clude the key frame as well. The key frame is independently
compressed and then encrypted using AES in a concatenated
manner. The key frame provides the run-length coding pa-
rameters to the decoder. The JEC scheme is applied to the
successive frames. Key-frame refresh rate is selected so as to
control the degradation in quality due to error propagation
in the sequence of frames during decoding.
For a frame other than the key frame, run-length coding
is followed by the representation of blocks of wavelet coeﬃ-
cients in each subband by the minimum number of bits re-
quired, 
log 2|Si|, where Si is the set of diﬀerent values in




The resulting bit stream is segmented into bytes in order to
directly apply GF(28) arithmetic during the joint encryption
and compression process. Since this approach maintains syn-
chronization among the data corresponding to all the frames
that are jointly processed during run-length coding, it allows
us to successfully apply JEC as described in Section 3. JEC
allows compression by a factor given by n/(n − k) with an
(n, k, 256) HD code since a block of n-bytes is transformed
into a block of n− k bytes at the joint compression/diﬀusion









(a) Schematic (b) Foreman
Figure 2: Passband structure for a 2D subband transform with D = 3.
stage of the JEC. As long as the diﬀerence between two adja-
cent frames is such that for each block of n-bytes, the diﬀer-
ence is only t ≤ (n − k)/2 bytes, the frames can be perfectly
decoded. However, the diﬀerences in the wavelet coeﬃcients
of adjacent frames are distributed rather non-uniformly in
general, and therefore limited diﬀerence per block of n-bytes
as mentioned above is not guaranteed. We achieve the best
result by systematically swapping the bytes prior to JEC to
achieve t ≤ (n− k)/2 bytes of diﬀerence per block of n-bytes
wherever possible. In the process, a swap table is built and
included in the header. This process significantly enhances
the overall decoding capability with a given t. Nevertheless,
if the diﬀerence between the adjacent frames is excessive,
not all blocks can be decoded successfully, that is, there is a
limit to the overall correctable errors. However, this is true of
any Slepian-Wolf coding scheme based on error-correcting
codes.
A nonkey frame is jointly decrypted and decompressed
with the use of previously decoded frame. The intermediate
results following the joint decryption and decompression of
such a frame are stored to be used as side information for
the decoding of the next nonkey frame. Following the joint
decryption and decompression phase, the bits are regrouped
to represent the encoded wavelet coeﬃcients. Run-length de-
coding and inverse wavelet transform follow.
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In the proposed JEC scheme, the compression is included
in the first layer of tenth round of the joint compression-
encryption scheme as shown in Figure 4. The row shifting
and column mixing operations in the first round is replaced
by the syndrome encoding of HD codes. Similarly, during the
decryption, the inverse-column mix and inverse-row shift
operations of the last round are replaced by joint decryp-
tion and decompression process. In the implementation of
our JEC scheme, we used (7, 3, 256)-HD code, that is, n = 7,
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Figure 3: Functional diagram of proposed MJPEG2000.
5.1. Compression and savings in computation
This implementation achieves a lossless compression ratio
of n/(n − k) = 7/4. Although other implementations with
varying degrees of compression are possible using other HD
codes, we leave the design of a family of joint compression-
encryption ciphers for future work.
In the AES cipher, 128 bit blocks of data are arranged in
a 4× 4 matrix [15]. This matrix of data undergoes initial key
addition and substitution. Each of the round functions that
follow consists of a diﬀusion layer implemented by the row
shifting and column mixing operation followed by the ad-
dition of a round key and substitution. In the proposed JEC
scheme, we start with a matrix of 7×4 bytes of data. Each col-
umn of 7 bytes is compressed using syndrome forming trans-
form obtained from the (7, 3, 256) HD-code. This leads to a
4×4 data matrix. The key addition and substitution function
of the first round and the functionalities of remaining rounds
follow the AES cipher.
The savings in computational steps of the JEC compared
to a concatenated system in a layer (compression followed by
encryption) are as follows. For the basic operations on a byte,
namely, addition, substitution, and multiplication, we as-
sume one unit of complexity. The actual complexity of these
diﬀerent operations may vary, and are highly dependent on
the particular architecture. Nevertheless with reasonably op-
timized architecture, energy consumptions for these opera-
tions will be comparable and may not be drastically diﬀerent.
In the JEC, we start with a matrix of 7× 4 bytes of row data.






































Figure 4: Flow chart of the proposed secure joint-distributed encryption and compression: (a) compression/encryption (b) decompres-
sion/decryption. HDSE stands for high-diﬀusion syndrome decoding, and represents multiplication with the HD parity check matrix; and
HDSD (high-diﬀusion syndrome decoding) represents the syndrome decoding process.
Thus the initial key addition requires 7 × 4 = 28 additions.
Equal number of substitutions follows. In the compression
phase, there are 28 multiplications and equal number of ad-
ditions. In total, there are 28× 4 = 112 operations.
Compared to that, in a concatenated approach (com-
pression followed by encryption), the compression requires
28 multiplications and that many additions. The joint
compression-diﬀusion operation of the first round has an
output of 4 × 4 = 16 bytes. In the encryption stage, there
are 16 key addition operations and 16 substitutions. The
row shifting operation requires 16 multiplications and many
additions. The mix-column operation also requires equal
amount of computations. Thus there are 2 × 28 + 4 × 16
= 120 units of operations in total. Similarly, at the decoder,
the JEC requires 28 substitutions and 28 additions during key
addition in addition to the decompression procedure lead-
ing to 2 × 28 = 56 units of computations. In contrast, the
concatenated system requires 8 × 16 = 128 units of com-
putation in the inverse column mixing, row shifting, substi-
tution, and key addition operations prior to decompression.
Thus we have a saving of (120 + 128)− (112 + 56) = 80 units.
The total number of computations in the compression and
first round of AES cipher in the concatenated system being
2× 28 + 8× 16 = 184 units, we have a saving of 43.5% in this
round.
Considering all 10 rounds of AES cipher, we have 2 ×
28 + 10 × 8 × 16 + 4 × 16 = 1400 units of computation
thus resulting in a saving of 5.7%. Note that if a technique
to progressively compress at more than one round is achiev-
able, larger saving will result. The computational results from
the implementation show that in all the cases with Hamming
distances≤ t between the correlated vectors x and y, x is per-
fectly decoded with the knowledge of y in compliance with
the theoretical conclusions.
5.2. SMJPEG2000 video coding
We incorporated the implementation of JEC as parameter-
ized above into MJPEG2000 video coding to produce the S-
MJPEG 2000 joint compression encryption scheme. Three-
layer coding was used (D = 3). With the “container” se-
quence as the test sample, we obtained savings in bit rate
while maintaining the same quantization step sizes for both
cases. With the quantization step sizes fixed, we achieve the
same peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) performance with
standard MJPEG2000 and the proposed SMJPEG2000. Com-
parison of rate allocations with the standard JPEG2000 and
the proposed scheme is shown in Table 2 with varying quan-
tization step sizes. We observe savings up to 9.7% with this
sequence. Figure 5 shows the comparison of PSNR for step
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Table 2: Comparison of average bit rates achieved for the MJPEG 2000 and the proposed S-MJPEG 2000 for the subset of five frames of the
“Container” sequence. The first column shows the step sizes used for the diﬀerent wavelet bands.




32.5, 32.50, 65.00, 16.25, 16.25, 32.50, 8.13, 8.13, 16.25, 4.06 1.7544 1.7058 2.77
16.25, 16.25, 32.50, 8.13, 8.13, 16.25, 4.06, 4.06, 8.13, 2.03 1.1018 1.0374 5.84
8.13, 8.13, 16.25, 4.06, 4.06, 8.13, 2.03, 2.03, 4.06, 1.02 0.6455 0.5830 9.68


















Figure 5: Comparison of peak signal-to-noise ratio for various
frames of the “Container” sequence at bit rates of 0.6455 bits/pixel
for the MJPEG 2000 and 0.5830 bits/pixel for the S-MJPEG 2000
algorithm.
sizes as in the third row of Table 2. The size of the swap table
in this case has been 2.4% of the total amount of data from
the encoded frame. For sequences with more motion, this
amount is observed to increase. For example, for foreman
sequence and bus sequence, we observe, respectively, 7.6%
and 18% overheard. This framework also achieved security
with savings in computational requirements as discussed in
the previous sections.
6. CONCLUSION
We presented a joint encryption and compression paradigm
for correlated sources. The theoretical framework establish-
ing the feasibility of such a paradigm has been discussed.
It is shown that under key addition and substitution prim-
itives of encryption process, the correlation between blocks
of data is preserved leading to the possibility of joint dis-
tributed compression and encryption. We also presented the-
orems establishing the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for a transform to achieve maximum branch number so re-
quired in the diﬀusion layer of state-of-the-art data encryp-
tion schemes. We discussed the construction of one such
joint encryption compression scheme based on the recently
proposed high-diﬀusion (HD) codes. We also presented a se-
cure MJPEG2000 (SMJPEG2000) framework where the joint
encryption and compression scheme is successfully applied
to achieve improved compression by exploiting interframe
correlation while at the same time ensuring that the content
is encrypted. Since the proposed scheme is a joint encryption
compression scheme, it has a computational advantage over
the traditional concatenated schemes.
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